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Abstract
Annex K of C11, bounds-checking interfaces, recently in-
troduced a set of alternative functions to mitigate buffer over-
flows, primarily those caused by string/memory functions.
However, poor compatibility limits their adoption. Failure
oblivious computing can eliminate the possibility that an at-
tacker can exploit memory errors to corrupt the address space
and significantly increase the availability of systems.
In this paper, we present S3Library (Saturation-Memory-
Access Safer String Library), which is compatible with
the standard C library in terms of function signature. Our
technique automatically replaces unsafe deprecated memo-
ry/string functions with safer versions that perform bounds
checking and eliminate buffer overflows via boundless mem-
ory. S3Library employs MinFat, a very compact pointer rep-
resentation following the Less is More principle, to encode
metadata into unused upper bits within pointers. In addition,
S3Library utilizes Saturation Memory Access to eliminate
illegal memory accesses into boundless padding area. Even if
an out-of-bounds access is made, the faulty program will not
be interrupted. We implement our scheme within the LLVM
framework on X86-64 and evaluate our approach on correct-
ness, security, runtime performance and availability.
1 Introduction
Buffer overflows remain a major threat to the security of de-
pendable computer systems today [44]. Applications written
in low-level languages like assembly or C/C++ are prone to
buffer overflow bugs. From 2008 to 2014, nearly 23 percent of
all severe software vulnerabilities were buffer errors, and 72
percent of buffer errors were serious [16]. In 2018, among the
16,556 security vulnerabilities recorded by the NIST National
Vulnerability Database [4], 2,368 (14.3%) were overflow vul-
nerabilities. Meanwhile, buffer overflow is listed as the first
position in Weaknesses CWE Top 25(2019) [1].
The danger inherent in the use of unsafe standard C library
calls, especially the string/memory functions, presents classic
buffer overflows. These contiguous overflows still cover over
40 percent in real-world exploitation [3]. Early designers of
standard C (specifically ANSI) over-trusted the programmers.
A host of vulnerable functions calls they provide, such as
gets, strcpy and memcpy, neither make bounds checking to
determine whether the destination buffer is big enough nor
have the size information needed to perform such checks.
Annex K of C11, Bounds-checking interfaces [19, 37, 45],
recently proposed a set of new, optional alternative library
functions that promote safer, more secure programming. The
apparent difference (we will explain in later section) is that
the APIs have _s suffix and take an additional size argu-
ment explicitly passed by programmers. Intuitively, adopting
these APIs in an existing code requires non-trivial modifi-
cations leading to poor compatibility and guidance. This is
the main reason why the new APIs continue to be controver-
sial [12,26,38], despite almost a decade since its introduction.
Furthermore, there is almost no viable conforming implemen-
tation [24] applying the bounds-checking interfaces without
considerable origin code changes.
Various modern techniques have been proposed to enforce
memory safety, both statically and dynamically. Static analy-
sis [25, 41–43] that automatically transforming C programs
at source code level is hard to obtain a complete coverage be-
cause a certain type of size information is only available at run-
time. Dynamic defense mechanisms [7, 13, 21, 22, 28, 30, 39]
augment the original unmodified program with metadata
(bounds of live objects or allowed memory regions) and insert
bounds checking against this metadata before every memory
access for runtime detection. They all leave libraries uninstru-
mented and introduce manually written wrapper to maintain
the compatibility, performing simple bounds checking before
calling a real legacy function. However, all existing software-
based bounds-checking solutions exhibit high performance
overhead (50-150%), preventing them from wide adoption in
production runs. Address Sanitizer [39] is currently better in
terms of usability, but it is built for debugging purposes and
suffers from detecting non-contiguous out-of-bounds viola-
tions. Intel MPX [30] provides a promising hardware-assisted
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full-stack technique, but its implementation is proved not as
good enough as expected. Most of these approaches provide
complete protection for buffer overflow violations, detecting
both contiguous and non-contiguous overflows, but have rela-
tively high runtime overhead.
Performing bounds checking is costly due to large amounts
of metadata management: the metadata describing the object
bounds must be recorded, propagated and retrieved to check
numerous times. Among these processes, the checking is the
bottleneck. For each pointer dereference, metadata must be
loaded from memory/in-pointer to verify the validation of
the pointer. Once the pointer is out of bounds, it also gives
much pressure on the branch predictor and pipeline to handle
exceptions. As a result, the checking process accounts for the
vast majority of execution time.
In this paper, we propose an interesting idea in the explo-
ration space to concentrate only on buffer overflows caused by
highly-critical memory/string functions, rather than bounds
checking on each memory reference. With this “partial” mem-
ory safety, we wonder what trade-off we can achieve between
security and overhead. Meanwhile, we propose a feasible im-
plementation of Safe C Library without any modification to
existing C programs.
We present MinFat and S3Library, an interesting approach
to automatically replace unsafe deprecated functions like
strcpy with safer versions that perform bounds checking and
eliminate buffer overflows via boundless memory. MinFat
is based on the tagged pointer [20, 40] scheme that trans-
parently encodes bounds meta information of buffer (stack,
heap and global variables) within the pointer itself. We fol-
low the principle of Less is More and adopts a very compact
encoding scheme inspired by BaggyBounds [7] with the min-
imum bit-width that allows an effective way to retrieve object
bounds. S3Library retains the APIs compatibility with legacy
functions, and performs the same bounds checking as Safe
C Library. The property of MinFat trades memory for per-
formance and adds boundless padding [11, 32–34] to every
object. These boundless memory blocks support Saturation
Memory Access (SMA) to isolate the memory errors within
S3Library in case the runtime-constraint violation occurs.
Overall, this paper makes the following contributions:
• To the best of our knowledge, S3Library is the first run-
time solution that applies implementations of Safe C
Library without any modification of origin codes.
• A thorough analysis and evaluation of the overhead using
MinFat Pointer on selective functions.
• We present a buffer overflow elimination mechanism
within Safe C Library and evaluate its performance in
Section 5.3.
• An LLVM-based prototype of our design implemented in
X86-64 architecture environment, evaluated with respect
to security, availability and runtime performance.
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Figure 1: Pointer-based approach.
2 Background
2.1 Memory Safety
Enforcing Memory Sa f ety stops all memory corruption ex-
ploits. Existing runtime techniques that guarantee spatial and
temporal memory safety can be broadly categorized into two
classes: object-based approach and pointer-based approach.
Object-based approaches [18, 35, 39] associate metadata with
the location of the object in memory, not with each pointer.
The significant drawback is that its implementations are gener-
ally incomplete because they are unable to provide an accurate
bound information for each object. However, an accurate size
information is necessary for the implementation of Safe C
Library to perform bounds checks. Besides, object-based ap-
proaches are not suitable for non-contiguous buffer overflow
detection also due to the lack of accurate bounds information.
In this section, we focus on eliminating spatial memory
errors (i.e., buffer overflows) using the pointer-based ap-
proach, which is considered as the only way to support com-
prehensive memory safety [27]. Pointer-based approaches
[7, 13, 21, 22, 28, 30, 47] attach metadata with every pointer,
bounding the region of memory that pointer can legitimately
dereference. As presented in Figure 1, pointer-based ap-
proaches can be categorized into the following three classes
according to how current designs store and use metadata.
Look-up Table scheme: SoftBound [28, 29]. This class,
such as SoftBound, records base and bound metadata in a
disjoint metadata facility that is accessed by explicit table
look-ups. Figure 1(a) shows the way how SoftBound+CETS
organizes pointer metadata in a two-level trie for quick search-
ing purpose. With table look-ups, the accurate bound infor-
mation can be obtained in time whenever the pointer needs.
Unfortunately, this look-up table scheme cannot be considered
safe in multithread environments. Ideally, the load/store of the
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pointer and its bounds must be performed atomically. How-
ever, neither the current hardware implementations (e.g., Intel
MPX [30]) nor GCC/LLVM compilers enforce this atomicity.
Furthermore, this look-up table scheme imposes restrictions
on allowed memory layout, and some programs require sub-
stantial code changes to run correctly.
Fat Pointer scheme: CHERI [47]. One implementation of
pointer-based metadata is to expand all pointer into multi-
word f at pointers [48]. For example, CHERI uses 128-bit
fat pointers/capabilities to limit the range of memory that
each pointer is allowed to access, as presented in Figure 1(b).
The base and bound metadata fields always follow behind the
pointer and are maintained with a pointer structure. The fat
pointers give the system extra accuracy information needed to
call Safe C Library to avoid buffer overflow, but also change
the space requirement for a pointer. Consequently, compatibil-
ity with the precompiled library or kernel is lost. The modified
pointer representation makes it challenging to interface with
external libraries due to its ABI breaking nature.
Tagged Pointer scheme: Low-Fat Pointer [13, 23]. Tagged
Pointer scheme is a new method for tracking bounds infor-
mation that takes advantage of 64-bit systems with sufficient
pointer bit-width. The basic idea is to store the boundary meta
information within the representation of the machine pointer
itself, as shown in Figure 1(c). Pointer tagging avoids mem-
ory layout changes that the look-up table scheme results in.
Another benefit is that it can load the pointer and meta infor-
mation in only one memory operation, bringing no pressure
on the cache while retrieving the metadata. Besides, tagged
pointer has the same pointer representation as standard C in
contrast with fat pointer scheme, resulting in a better ABI
compatibility.
2.2 Safe C Library
Annex K of C11, bounds-checking interfaces, was intended
to introduce a set of new, optional alternative functions into
the standard C library to mitigate the security implication of
a subset of buffer overflows in existing code. Historically, the
design of Annex K dates back to an ISO/IEC technical report
in 2007 before being incorporated in C11 as normative Annex
K [19, 37, 45].
However, the software incompatibility [44] makes these
interfaces hard to adopt, despite over a decade since the intro-
duction of them [12, 26]. Specifically, these bounds-checking
interfaces have apparent differences in the API. These APIs
have _s suffix, commonly take an additional argument and
return a value of type errno_t rather than a pointer to the
destination buffer. For example, legacy strcat() is declared as
follows:
char* strcat(char* dest , const char* src);
It corresponds to the Annex K strcat_s (the syntactic differ-
ence is in bold font) whose declaration is the following:
errno_t strcat_s(
char* dest ,
rsize_t dmax,
const char* src);
Usability is critically essential in the design of a secure in-
terface. Unfortunately, adopting the APIs in millions of lines
of existing C/C++ legacy code requires non-trivial modifica-
tion mainly due to the following reasons [12, 38]:
Extra size argument. The additional argument dmax (the
size of destination buffer) is not always readily available at
the site of the replacement. While the length of the pointer to
an array can be determined using static analysis, a certain type
of storage information dynamically allocated is only available
at runtime. If we only pass the parameter using the sizeo f
operator, the overhead is apparent when the same destination
buffer is used as an argument to multiple API calls in the same
function. Besides, it can easily result in some programming
errors when the programmer incorrectly specifies the size of
source buffer (sizeo f src) instead of the destination array.
Distinct return value. The Annex K supports additional er-
ror handling features. It deploys the uniform return value of
errno_t to indicate the status of the returning functions, i.e.,
NULL pointer and zero length. While errno_t provides a gen-
eral exception handling mechanism, however, it will lead to
mistakes for the case when multiple API calls are in a single
expression. For example:
strcat ( strcpy(d, a), b);
the return value of strcpy records the result and the strcat uses
the return value of strcpy as the first parameter. The single
expression must be rewritten as two separated statements:
strcpy_s ( d, sizeof d, a );
strcat_s ( d, sizeof d, b );
Error handling policy. Annex K, C11 introduces a new term
into the C standard, namely runtime-constraint violations.
When a function detects an error (such as invalid parame-
ter or reference outside the bounds), a specific function (i.e.,
runtime-constraint handler) is called that either abort the pro-
gram or just issue an error message. This is in sharp contrast
to the runtime error handling in the standard C library, where
the behavior under such errors is mostly undefined (anything
may happen then, like buffer overflow). For security-critical
systems where forcing the system to terminate may indicate
the goal of an attack, continued execution [32–34] results in
security compromise. For example, embedded devices must
provide robust and continuous service in the presence of unex-
pected inputs. However, the current term runtime-constraint
handler lacks an elimination (or tolerant) way to make com-
puting invulnerable to known security attacks without inter-
rupting the normal execution path.
For the sake of convenience, we refer to all implementa-
tion of bounds-checking interfaces as Sa f e C Library. As a
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consequence of API incompatibility, experience with these
functions has not been supported well by the mainstream
compiler [2,5,6,36]. The largest body of experience in imple-
mentation comes from Microsoft. Unfortunately, Microsoft
implementation conforms neither to C11 nor to the original
TR 24731-1 [38]. In short, there is almost no viable con-
forming implementation applying Safe C Library without
considerable source code changes. This motivates our case
for an implementation of Safe C Library with the same API
compatibility as legacy functions.
3 Design
3.1 Threat Model
We assume that an attacker can exploit the victim program
to gain arbitrary read and write capabilities in the memory.
Temporal memory errors, e.g., use-after-free vulnerability,
are not considered in this paper. Furthermore, we assume
that all processor hardware can be trusted-it does not contain
vulnerabilities arising from exploits such as physical or glitch-
ing attacks. Our goal is to prevent spatial memory violations
caused by highly-critical unsafe legacy functions. Once an
out-of-bound memory access occurs, the faulty program will
not be interrupted. The un-contiguous buffer overflow that
happens in non-library codes is not under our protection.
3.2 MinFat Pointer
Our MinFat is a tagged pointer scheme that takes advantage
of 64-bit modern systems with sufficient pointer bit-width.
The basic idea is to encode, propagate and retrieve bounds
metadata information within tag bits of the pointer while
object allocation, pointer arithmetic and bounds check.
0010 11 00 7f  ff ff ff e2 00
tag virtual address
6 bits 58 bits
Figure 2: The encoding scheme of MinFat Pointer. The upper
6 bits represent the allocated size of the memory object. The
remaining 58 bits are used for virtual address.
Pointer Encoding. We extend the pointer tagging scheme
with a compact encoding format, perhaps the minimum one
along with the ability to cover almost all objects in memory.
This is the reason why we name it MinFat Pointer. Specifically,
MinFat Pointer uses the upper six bits to encode the object
size, allowing for a maximum allocation size of 264 bytes.
The remaining 58 bits are used to address in 64-bit virtual
memory space.
Padding
Allocation   Boundary
Object
Object  Boundary
Figure 3: Aligned and Padding in MinFat. The allocation
memory is always padded to a pow-of-2 alignment boundary.
Each of the MinFat Pointer is associated with a base address
(base for short) and specific allocation size (allocSize for
short). It is noted that the allocation size of an object is always
powers-of-two. The size configuration:
allocSize=< 2,4,8,16,32, ...,264 > Bytes
specifies that the MinFat allocator supports allocation sizes
of 2 Bytes, 4 Bytes, 8 Bytes, 16 Bytes, etc. The maximum
allocation size is 264 bytes, which is large enough to hold
any memory object in a 64-bit modern system. The MinFat
allocator ensures that every buffer or object should be aligned
to allocSize. Thus we can reconstruct the base using the fol-
lowing operations:
base(p) = (p / allocSize(p)) ∗ allocSize(p)
Correspondingly, we can also reconstruct the allocSize and
the TAG value recorded in upper bits as follows:
allocSize(p) = (p & MINFAT_MATCH) >> 58
TAG= log2(allocSize(p))
Here (&), (∗) and (/) are 64-bit integer bitwise AND, di-
vision, and multiplication. MINFAT_MATCH is the match-
ing value 0x03ffffffffffffff. Figure 2 illustrates our encoding
scheme: the upper 6 bits are MinFat TAG, followed by 58
bits virtual address. We record value B in the tag bits. The
allocation size of an object will be 2B bytes. Thus, in Figure 2,
the tag 001011 (whose decimal value is 11) represents the
211 = 2048 bytes allocation size for this object.
Our MinFat encoding scheme comes from the “buddy sys-
tem” method [7] of dynamic memory allocation algorithm,
which expands the object size of an allocation to its nearest
power-of-2. In contrast to prior schemes, the key insight ex-
ploited by our encoding scheme is that MinFat occupies the
minimum bit-width within the pointer by default (but config-
urable) and also can effectively represent large enough object
size in various real-world scenarios.
Padding and Aligning. The memory object in C/C++ comes
from three areas: stack, heap and global variables. During the
allocation of these objects, the requested object size (i.e., the
size parameter to malloc) is aligned (over-approximated) to
the nearest allocation size allocSize that fits. Figure 3 presents
the padding and aligning rationale in MinFat Pointer. For ex-
ample, consider an object O of type char[20] with an object
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size of sizeo f (O) = 20. Assuming the above size configu-
ration, the size will be rounded up to an allocation size of
allocSize= 32 by adding 12 bytes of padding.
To provide enough space for the defense mechanism
against out-of-bounds memory access, at least one byte of
padding is always added (so allocSize > object size) to ensure
our object will not be violated. These padding bytes are usu-
ally zero values, allowing for benign access by out-of-bounds
memory operation and we will discuss in Section 3.3. The
boundary checking is not to check the requested size, but
the allocation size recorded in the tag bits. Although MinFat
allocation algorithm results in some memory fragments, its ef-
fective encoding scheme makes it easy to extract the boundary
of a memory object as quickly as possible.
Pointer Arithmetic. In our threat model, we ignore the case
when pointers reference outside the bounds of an array or
buffer in application code. In this case, when an expression
contains pointer arithmetic(e.g., ptr+index) or pointer assign-
ment(e.g., newptr =ptr), the baseptr and allocSize is not go-
ing to be affected. Thus, the result pointer inherits the same
TAG of the original pointer because they belong to the same
object and has the same allocSize. As for pointer comparison,
we remove their tags for a fair comparison.
Pointer Dereference. The X86_64 standard require that the
upper bits of pointer value are sign-extended. Therefore, any
MinFat pointer dereference in application code has to trigger
the masking process to create the regular untagged pointer the
CPU expects. Since our scheme is not devoted to detect buffer
overflows in non-library code, we do not perform boundary
checking before each MinFat pointer dereference.
Function Calls. For selected string and memory functions,
MinFat pointers are passed directly as parameters to library
calls where they are masked at the entry of each function.
After the dereferencing and bounds-checking operations, the
tags are restored back at the end of the function call (if returns
a pointer), which offers protection for the next use. For other
external functions, we introduce manually written wrapper
and make masking operating in the wrapper functions before
calling a real libc function.
3.3 S3Library
Elimination and Detection. Existing defenses mechanisms
handle buffer overflow using a detection-only, fail-stop ap-
proach, e.g., [7, 28]. Annex K of C11, bounds-checking in-
terfaces also call the abort_handler_s for terminating the
function call in case a runtime-constraint violation occurs.
However, terminating a program (or function) allows poten-
tial Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks [34], and decreases the
availability of the system. In security-critical systems (such
as an airplane that must provide robust and continuous opeta-
tions in case of various unexpected inputs) forcing the system
to terminate may indicate the goal of an attack, and continued
execution [32–34] results in security compromise. For exam-
(a) Legacy Function
(b) C11 Annex K
(c)Saturation-Memory-Access Safer String Library
Exception Handler
(abort/ignore)
Out-Of-Bounds
Memory Access
In-Bounds
Memory Access
In-Bounds
Memory Access
In-Bounds
Memory Access
Saturation Memory Access
In-Bounds Memory
Boundless
Memory
Overflowed  Memory
Figure 4: Error handling policy of legacy function (a), C11
Annex K (b) and S3Library (c).
ple, servers and embedded devices all need continued running
to service legitimate requests.
Instead of terminating, systems can choose an elimination
way that manufactures a boundless [11] value within the allo-
cation boundary as the result of the illegal memory access and
keeps the program running with that value. The elimination
approach can achieve the same goal of isolating memory er-
rors without violating the data integrity property. Besides, the
error handling policy of Safe C Library also lacks an elimina-
tion way to make the library’s implementation invulnerable
to known security attacks without terminating the programs.
Saturation Memory Access. In this section, we propose
Saturation Memory Access (SMA) to provide an elimina-
tion way for the implementation of Safe C Library. MinFat
provides boundless memory blocks to out of bounds accesses.
Instead of allowing out of bounds accesses to corrupt the ad-
dress space or aborting the program by an exception, SMA
utilizes these boundless memory blocks and takes actions that
allow the program continued execution without interruption.
As presented in Figure 3, MinFat adds additional padding
bytes to every object so that its size will be power of two
and base address will be calculated by aligning the allocation
size. The property not only allows an effective way to lookup
object bounds but also automatically adds the tolerant feature
to C programs.
We derived our elimination (or tolerant) way from fail-
ure oblivious computing [34]. The implementation of fail-
5
ure oblivious computing simply discards the illegal memory
writes, and out-of-bounds reads values are forged based on a
heuristic. In SMA, instead of discarding and forging, out-of-
bounds memory accesses are redirected into the last padding
bytes. These padding bytes allows benign access by out-of-
bounds memory operations and referencing them does not
violate the data integrity property. SMA manufactures the
boundless memory value within the allocation boundary as
the result of illegal memory access to keep the programs run-
ning with that value.
S3Library. There are two major barriers to the adoption
of Safe C Library. One barrier is software incompatibility.
Adopting the new APIs in existing codes requires non-trivial
modification. In general, a safe C library function needs pro-
grammers to provide an extra size parameter, either explicitly
or implicitly, to perform checks within the function. The prob-
lem of explicit passing is that original APIs must be rewritten
and source code compatibility will be lost. In our design, Min-
Fat allows implicitly pass way of the size parameter into a
safe C library function without API modifications.
The other barrier is its incomplete error handling policy.
The current term runtime-constraint handler lacks an elimi-
nation way to automatically isolate memory errors without
interruption. In our design, SMA enables the computing to
continue its normal execution path through memory errors.
In order to break the two barriers, we propose Saturation-
memory-access Safer String Library (S3Library) to combine
the feature of MinFat and Saturation Memory Access to rein-
force the implementation of Safe C Library. Specifically, the
encoded metadata within MinFat Pointer is implicitly passed
into the library function to perform bounds checking, allowing
S3Library retains the same API as legacy functions. Mean-
while, S3Library performs SMA to eliminate the runtime-
constraint violation by correcting the illegal address into a
redundant memory block and the faulty program will not be
terminated. Continued execution can significantly increase
the availability of S3Library.
Figure 4 presents the difference in principle between
S3Library and Annex K bounds-checking interfaces over
buffer overflow. Take a string-copy function as an exam-
ple. In our case, the behavior of legacy functions is mostly
undefined and dangerous memory operations continue un-
til the program crashes, as shown in Figure 4(a). Annex K,
bounds-checking interfaces perform bounds checking and call
a runtime-constraint handler to deal with the out-of-bounds
memory access, usually triggering an exception and termi-
nating the program as presented in Figure 4(b). In contrast,
Figure 4(c) illustrates how S3Library performs Saturation
Memory Access and simply manufactures a boundless mem-
ory block (the last padding byte) to the programs as the result
of the write operation. The last padding byte always exists
that the MinFat allocator guarantees. The implementation of
S3Library will be discussed in more detail in Section 4.3.
4 Implementation
4.1 Overview
Figure 5 gives an overview of our system architecture.
S3Library
Source Code
Runtime
Support
Library
Runtime
Support
Library
Runtime
Support
Library
External
Library
Loader
&
Linker
MinFat
Instrument
Generate
Code
Analyse
Generate
IR
C Source Code
Hardened
Executable
Figure 5: Overall system architecture of MinFat and
S3Library
The hardening is performed by a compile-time instrumen-
tation pass. It converts source code to an intermediate rep-
resentation (IR), generates boundary metadata and replaces
the legacy functions name with _ss suffix. We modify the
S3Library source code by inserting the tag-masking opera-
tions and Saturation Memory Access to ensure the continued
execution rather than triggering a fault or an exception. Then,
S3Library source codes are compiled into binary libraries
with which the generated code is linked to create a harden
executable.
We have implemented a prototype of MinFat Pointers and
runtime dynamically loadable S3Library as an extension to
clang/LLVM 4.0 for Linux on the x86-64 architecture on top
of the LLVM compiler infrastructure. The code consists of
3,797 SLOC of LLVM C++ pass, which adds the instrumenta-
tion of MinFat. An additional 5,347 SLOC make up external
libc wrapper (exclude string and memory functions).
4.2 MinFat implementation
Our MinFat implementation is based on the approach Low-
Fat [13,23]. MinFat follows the principle of Less is More and
adopts a very compact representation for bounds information
inspired by BaggyBounds.
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MinFat stack and heap allocators are all implemented as an
LLVM compiler infrastructure pass that replaces the default
allocation (as represented by the LLVM intermedia represen-
tation alloca and malloc instructions). Upon the allocation,
all objects are enforced the allocation boundary instead of
object boundary, padding and aligning to the nearest power
of two. Meanwhile, we store the binary logarithm of the al-
location size into the upper six bits within each pointer. Be-
sides, all global variables are all tagged using LLVM pass.
Before pointer dereferences, the pointers with TAG have to
be masked to create the regular untagged pointer that the
CPU expects. Since we focus on buffer overflows resulting
from highly-spirit string/memory functions, no checking is
performed before every memory access (but addable). For
pointer assignment, the result pointer inherits the same TAG
of the original. Moreover, we remove the TAG to guarantee
fairness when it comes to pointer comparison.
In order to make it easy to use for programmers, we provide
an additional compiler flag to invoke our passes during the
compilation, just like the way of Address Sanitizer.
4.3 Runtime Library Support
Implementation. We introduce alternatives for selective un-
safe deprecated memory/string, stdio, stdlib and time func-
tions, as listed in Table 1. These unsafe functions include
almost all C11 Annex K secure versions except <wchar.h>.
The work of adding wide char functions will be finished in the
future. We choose them for the reason that they are the main
threats to overflow vulnerability based on experience with
real-world security bugs [17]. In terms of function signatures,
all S3Library function names have _ss suffix, like adding _s
suffix for C11 Annex K functions. The additional “s” means
the feature of Saturation Memory Access.
Table 1: List of functions in S3Library.
Header Functions Name
<string.h> strcpy_ss, strcat_ss, strnlen_ss, strncpy_ss,
strncat_ss, strtok_ss, strerror_ss, mem-
cpy_ss, memset_ss, memmove_ss
<stdio.h> gets_ss, fopen_ss, freopen_ss, printf_ss,
fprintf_ss, vprintf_ss, vfprintf_ss, sprintf_ss,
snprintf_ss, vsprintf_ss, vsnprintf_ss,
tmpfile_ss, tmpnam_ss
<stdlib.h> getenv_ss
<time.h> asctime_ss, ctime_ss, gmtime_ss, local-
time_ss
S3Library is implemented as a dynamically loadable li-
brary that must be preloaded for every process to be pro-
tected. We believe the fact that runtime checks to verify
lengths should be done inside the library functions rather than
wrappers [8, 9]. Bounds-checking interfaces perform more
checking implementations than what is done in wrappers.
Original Program
Instrumented Program
src = malloc(M)
dst = malloc(N)
*src = ‘a’
strcpy (dst, src)
do{
si =  src + i
di = dst + i
val = load si
store val, di
}while(val!=‘\0’)
src = minfat_malloc(M + padding)
dst = minfat_malloc(N + padding)
src_m = masking(src)
*src_m = ‘a’
strcpy_ss (dst, src)
dLB,dUB = extract(dst)
sLB, sUB = extract(src)
dst_m = masking(dst)
src_m = masking(src)
do{
si =  src_m + i
di = dst_m + i
if bounds_violated(si,sLB,sUB)
si = sUB
val = load si
if bounds_violated(di,dLB,dUB)
di = dUB
store val, di
}while(val!=‘\0’)
(a)Memory safety enforcement of original code via S3Library 
(b)Error Handling Policy of legacy(b1), C11 Annex K(b2) and S3Library(b3)
Intruded Program
src = malloc(M)
dst = malloc(N)
*src = ‘a’
strcpy_s (dst, N, src)
do{
si =  src_m + i
di = dst_m + i
val = load si
if bounds_ check(di, dUB)
crash(di)
store val, di
}while(val!=‘\0’)
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
Figure 6: Memory Safety enforcement of strcpy function code
in original program(a) via: C11 Annex K(b) and S3Library(c).
For example, NULL pointer checking, zero-length checking,
buffer-overlapping checking. If all these checks are handled
with wrappers, it frequently duplicates the work done insides
the safe C library. Consequently, we take away wrappers for
these selected string/memory functions, and the program calls
their corresponding _ss safer versions directly.
Illustration. To illustrate how S3Library works in practice,
consider an example in Figure 6. Take the strcpy() in an origi-
nal program as an example. In order to call a bounds-checking
interface strcpy_s, programmers have to manually extend the
parameter list with destination buffer size N, resulting in an
intruded program. S3Library instruments the program and
automatically replaces the strcpy with strcpy_ss. In applica-
tion codes, heap objects bounds are stored in upper bits for
future checks by MINFAT allocator (min f at_malloc) (line
1-2). Pointers with tags have to be explicitly masked before
every load/store instruction (line 3) and directly passed into
the strcpy_ss as the parameter with encoded metadata (line
4). At the entry of the strcpy_ss(), we insert the extracting
operations to decode the metad ta information (i.e., sLB, dLB,
sUB, dUB), and masking operations to mask the tag bits for
the following dereferences (line 6-9). Then we verify if the
accessed address is within the bound of the referent object
on each memory access (line 13,16). In case the runtime-
constraints are violated, we perform SMA and manufacture
the last padding value to the program as the result of mem-
ory read/write (line 14,17), and the instrumented program
7
continues to run without interruption.
Optimization. By default, S3Library ensures protection from
destination buffer overwrites and source buffer overreads. C
standard semantics guarantee that a legal and uncorrupted
string variable ends up with ‘\0’, thus we can simply return
early and finish the copy of string once the source buffer
value is ‘\0’. In this way, we can protect only the destina-
tion buffer overwrites in S3Library implementation that can
already supply sufficiently high security guarantees. As for
SMA implementation, all overwrites are directed into the last
boundless byte. We can only handle the last overwrite opera-
tion using SMA and ignore the other overwrites because the
results of all other overwrites are overlapped by the last one.
5 Evaluation
To evaluate the usefulness and value of our S3Library, we
answer the following four research questions:
Q1. Correctness. Does our S3Library work? Does it break
the original work? Does our approach scale to large programs?
Q2. Security. What level of security is achieved by S3Library
according to some security benchmarks like RIPE and NIST?
More precisely, does it eliminate buffer overflow vulnerabili-
ties originating from unsafe library function’s call?
Q3. Performance. What would be the trade-off between se-
curity and performance if we only protect highly-critical mem-
ory/string functions using a tagged-pointer approach. What
is the performance overhead of S3Library in contrast with
bounds-checking interfaces?
Q4. Availability. Does our approach normally run in real-
world applications, such as Nginx web server?
We made related experiments in order to answer the four
questions better. For correctness, we applied our program
transformations and safer library on a set of local test suites
and SPEC CPU2006 benchmark. For security, we employed
the RIPE security benchmark [46] and NIST’s SARD refer-
ence dataset (Juliet Test Suite for C/C++) [4]. For runtime
performance, we first measured overhead at a function call
level. Next, the overall performance of C and C++ programs
of the SPEC CPU2006 benchmark suite were evaluated. To
test availability and usability, we compiled and ran Ngnix
Web Server to evaluate our effects on its GET/POST service.
We ran our benchmarks on Intel Xeon E5-2609 machines
with 16 cores at 1.70GHz and 32GB of memory, running
the 64-bit Ubuntu 16.04.4 LTS. All the benchmarks are
compiler with our modified clang version 4.0 with “-O2 -
fanitize=lowfat” flags and “-lsafestring-s” flags to link our
S3Library.
5.1 Correctness
We first evaluated the correctness of S3Library using C/C++
programs of SPEC CPU2006. We use the ref input sets and
run to completion. To obtain a quantitative estimation on
the amounts of instrumented library functions, we utilize
ltrace [10] to dynamically collect the library information.
Table 2 presents the histogram of the amounts of the instru-
mented calls while running SPEC CPU2006.
Table 2: Numbers of dynamic instrumented calls in SPEC.
Benchmark Number Benchmark Number
401.bzip2 13 462.libquantum 8
429.mc f 25,168 464.h264re f 222
433.milc 689 470.lbm 97
444.namd 2,909 473.astar 27
456.hmmer 31,447 482.sphinx3 655,538
458.s jeng 12,779
Table 2 reveals that the number of instrumented calls varies
in different benchmarks. For example, a large amount of
strtok in 456.hmmer, a great deal of strlen in 482.sphinx3.
However, there are almost none instances of functions like
memcmp, strerror and time-related calls in SPEC CPU2006,
so we make another local test suites for every function to
verify the original functionality. The result shows that our
implementation passed test sets all.
The running results on SPEC CPU2006 show that our
MinFat approach can pass 7 CINT benchmarks and 3 CFP
benchmarks. Some other benchmarks will malfunction when
compiled with MinFat approach because the tagged pointer
scheme has inherent compatibility issues. For example, pro-
grams like gcc manipulate high bits of pointers, causing dam-
age to the original program. Patches to solve the compatibility
issue will be done in future work.
Based on the above validation steps, we conclude that our
MinFat and S3Library implementation is correct and valid
without impairing the original functionality, thus being able
to serve as a solid basis to answer the Q1.
5.2 Security
To test the security guarantees of our S3Library, we employed
the RIPE benchmark [46] and NIST’s SARD reference dataset
(Juliet Test Suite for C/C++) [4]. The results are shown in
Table 3 and Table 4.
RIPE. An extension of Wilander’s Lamkar’s security bench-
mark, provides a standard way of testing the coverage of
a defense mechanism against buffer overflow. RIPE claims
to cover 850 working buffer overflow attacks from five di-
mensions including location, target code pointer, overflow
technique, attack code and function abused.
In order to make native testings on RIPE benchmarks, we
firstly deployed a 64-bit RIPE because the original RIPE
only supports 32-bit. Secondly, we removed 4 sub-object
overflows attacks and “homebrew” function attack (a loop-
based equivalent of memcpy in non-library code) because they
are outside the protection boundary of our implementation.
We tested all the remaining RIPE parameter combinations
(735 valid attacks in total). Table 3 shows the security results
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Figure 7: Memcpy to a stack, global and heap buffer.
of all approaches. Successfully means arbitrary code execu-
tion. Failed attacks are repeatably prevented. GCC 5.4.0 -O2
could not detect 33 out of these 735 attacks and the number
of MinFat+glibc is 2, which were all about abusing “mem-
cpy”. Our MinFat+S3Library implementation prevented the
remaining two memcpy attacks. One attack was eliminated by
Saturation Memory Access within the memcpy_ss function.
The other one was inhibited by the length check at the entry,
invoking an exception and returning in advance. The result
shows that all attacks had been successfully prevented by our
MinFat and S3Library implementation.
Table 3: Results of RIPE security benchmark.
Implementation Successfully Failed Total
GCC5.4.0 33 702 735
MinFat+glibc 2 733 735
MinFat+S3Library 0 735 735
NIST. NIST’s SARD (Software Assurance Reference
Dataset) is a collection of thousands of test programs with
known security flaws. SARD’s Juliet C/C++ Test Suite ver-
sion 1.3 provides 64,099 test cases and more than 100,000
files, which is referred to as the most comprehensive bench-
mark available for C/C++ buffer overflow vulnerabilities. We
select CWE121: Stack-based Buffer Overflow and CWE-122:
Heap-based Buffer Overflow for the experiment. These two
test suites are related to unsafe library functions calling.
We mainly tested three most common vulnerable functions:
memcpy, strcpy and strcat, which we consider are the main
threats to buffer overflow flaws in a large amount of real-
life open-source programs. S3Library was applied to 1,939
programs across CWE121 and CWE122. Table 4 shows the
amounts of vulnerable programs and involved unsafe func-
tions we have tested.
CWE 121 consists of 854 programs representing stack-
based buffer overflow caused by abusing memcpy, strcpy and
strcat. In these programs, a fixed-size dest buffer is created
in stack memory space and then assigned with values from
src buffer that is too large for it to hold. Our implementation
first reallocates pow-of-two objects for them. These boundless
padding blocks, to some extend, tolerates the difference of size
between src and dest as long as their size is identical after pow-
of-two alignment. Finally, S3Library, such as memcpy_ss,
will perform bounds checking and SMA to eliminate out-
of-bound memory access whenever any runtime-constraint
occurs.
CWE 122 consists of 1,085 programs representing heap-
based buffer overflow caused by abusing memcpy, strcpy
and strcat. The difference between CWE 122 and CWE
121 that the dest buffer is allocated in heap memory. Min-
Fat+S3Library executes a similar behavior. MinFat tags the
pointers, replaces unsafe functions with suffix _ss and calls
the _ss functions at runtime.
Program in Juliet C/C++ version 1.3 has a good function
and a bad function in each file. The good function passes
the correct and appropriate size to the function to perform
some string or memory operations. The bad function passes a
wrong and inappropriate size and produces either a segment
fault or incorrect output results. Teble 4 presents the result
that our MinFat and S3Library implementation has eliminated
all 1,939 vulnerabilities in bad functions.
Table 4: Results of NIST’s Juliet C/C++ Test Suites.
Buffer Overflow Type memcpy strcpy strcat
CWE 121: Stack-based 434 248 172
CWE 122: Heap-based 624 269 192
Total 1058 517 364
Based on the above validation steps, we conclude that our
MinFat and S3Library implementation is security enough
that original programs run normally without segment fault
and buffer overflow followed by a control flow hijack did not
occur, serving as a solid basis to answer the Q2.
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Figure 8: Performance Overhead on SPEC 2006
5.3 Runtime Performance
Microbenchmark. First, we need to figure out the overhead
at a function call level. We present the comparison of execu-
tion times of one most commonly used function: memcpy()
for the following three cases.
- Legacy function without any protection.
- Safe C Library using implementations of C11 Annex K,
bounds-checking interfaces.
- S3Library with the same API as legacy function but
performs bounds checking.
The time required by a single memcpy() from the same
local buffer into global, stack and heap buffer was measured
for varying numbers of bytes copied. We use “-fno-builtin-”
flags to disable the inline optimization in clang/LLVM. As
presented in Figure 7, there is no significant difference in per-
formance overheads of different types of destination buffers.
As we can expect, bounds checking progress leads to several
times overhead as the number of bytes copied increases. The
performance effects on additional extracting and masking
progress in S3Library can be negligible when the number of
bytes exceeds 200.
SPEC CPU2006 benchmarks. Next, we report the overhead
over the SPEC CPU2006 benchmark suite. We compare three
versions of implementations:
- Base: The uninstrumented program that uses the default
allocator and legacy functions.
- MinFat+glibc: The program instrumented with MinFat,
but calling standard functions in wrappers.
- MinFat+S3Library: The instrumented program with
MinFat and instrumented S3Library calls.
We run each benchmark-input pair three times and use the
average execution time as its performance. Figure 8 shows
the performance overhead normalized to the baseline (Base).
Each overhead number is the average of 3 iterations of the
same program (using the reference workset for SPEC). On
average, MinFat+S3Lirary incurs a 1.32x slowdown.
We observe that the performance difference between Min-
Fat+S3library and MinFat+glibc is negligible. This is ex-
pected because the number of call instructions, as shown in
Table 2, is much lower than the number of load/store and allo-
cation instructions in SPEC [31]. Without the checks, tagging
and masking operations are the main associated performance
overhead caused by pointer-based approaches, especially for
pointer-intensive programs. 456.hmmer and 464.h264ref has
top 2 load/store instructions ratios, 65.9% and 54.9% respec-
tively [31]. Additionally, 458.sjeng is a program that plays
chess and there is a large number of local buffers to be allo-
cated in programs, taking more time for tagging operations.
464.h264ref that is related to video compression has the same
situation [14]. In total, those are the reasons why these three
programs have relatively higher performance overhead.
We conclude that the implementation of MinFat is much
more expensive than S3Library, and tasks on how to opti-
mize the overhead of tagging and masking operations will be
discussed in Section 7.
Table 5: Memory Overhead on SPEC 2006.
Benchmark MinFat+glibc MinFat+S3Library
401.bzip2 -0.30% -0.33%
429.mc f 0.03% 0.01%
433.milc 0.13% 0.11%
444.namd 18.86% 18.19%
456.hmmer 40.82% 40.16%
458.s jeng 0.72% 0.62%
462.libquantum 27.08% 17.79%
464.h264re f 65.07% 64.75%
470.lbm 0.09% 0.05%
473.astar 189.72% 189.88%
482.sphinx3 63.00% 62.48%
gomean 29.16% 28.08%
To determine the impact of our scheme on memory us-
age, we have measured the mean resident set size (RSS)
while running the SPEC CPU2006 benchmark suite. Table 5
presents the memory overhead on SPEC2006. MinFat uti-
lizes a straightforward encoding scheme. However, the sim-
ple encoding results in obvious memory overhead through
fragmentation. For example, 473.astar reads various map re-
gion size for region-based path finding algorithm, resulting
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Figure 9: Throughout-Latency for Nginx web server.
in large memory fragments. Fortunately, there are 10 unused
bits remaining to improve our encoding and reduce internal
fragments. This work will be done in the future. Besides, Min-
Fat+S3Library calls directly _ss functions rather than calling
through wrappers, which helps reduce memory overhead.
5.4 Availability
For availability, we tested Nginx version 1.16.1 (the stable
version). Nginx is a free, open-source and lightweight HTTP
server. To successfully run Nginx under MinFat, we manually
add llvm wrappers for each I/O system-call function to mask
the argument pointers with tags and insert an uninstrumented
statement before each inline assembly.
The ab benchmark was run on a client machine to generate
workload. We test two types of modes: GET and POST. For
Get mode, we fetch a static web page from localhost via HTTP.
To adapt the load, we set a fixed number of issued requests
and increase the amounts of concurrent requests at a time. The
results are shown in Figure 9. We observe negligible effects
on performance because Nginx is not a primarily CPU-bound
application and does relatively few memory operations.
Table 6: Nginx HTTP server benchmark POST overhead.
Implementation Timings(ms) Memory(KB)
nginx-1.16.1-Baseline 121.48 414976
nginx-1.16.1-MinFat 128.9(6.11%) 417300(0.56%)
nginx-1.16.1-S3Library 129.5(6.60%) 417048(0.50%)
The implementation of POST mode further confirms the
result. For this test, we transfer a relatively small file (200MB)
to the local host with the purpose to stress the CPU and pro-
vide an objective result using MinFat. Each test was run for
a total of 50 times and results were averaged. For the time
consumption and memory usage, both overheads of MinFat
and S3Library was very low. On average, we observe a 6.60%
increase in latency and a 0.50% increase in memory bloat, as
shown in Table 6.
6 Related Work
The Libsafeplus technique [8] shares some common motiva-
tions and ideas with S3Library. However, S3Library performs
more checking implementations than bounds checking done
in wrappers. For example, buffer-overlapping checking. We
think if all these checkings are handled with wrappers, it du-
plicates the work done inside the safe C library. This is the
reason why we remove wrappers for our S3Library. Moreover,
Libsafeplus needs the target program compiled with -g option
in advance to extract the debugging information, which is not
always allowed in many cases.
7 Discussion and Future Work
Encoding Scheme. Our MinFat Pointer prototype utilizes 6
bits to address 264 bytes virtual space. This is the minimum
encoding scheme by default (but configurable) with obvious
memory bloat. However, the remaining 10 bits are unused
since the upper bit of a 48-bit pointer is reserved for kernel
space in most operating systems. Thus efficient allocation
algorithm and safer memory safety scheme with these bits
will be explored in our future work.
Performance Overhead. The main runtime overhead results
from two parts: tagging on each live object and masking be-
fore each memory access. Some architectures, e.g., AArch64,
provide hardware supports for virtual address tagging and
allow MMU to ignore the upper bits during address transla-
tion [15]. Thus the masking operation before each pointer
dereference can be omitted. Besides, our scheme can be more
effective if MinFat’s implementation is supported by instruc-
tion set extensions. For example, tag-masking operations can
be integrated into the execution of load/store instruction and
accelerated by related hardware units.
Coverage. Additional S3Library functions also make strong
candidates, such as POSIX and other ANSI C. Our approach
still has to extend the secure functions list and provides a
good coverage, although a thorough examination of industry
practice is required to make a complete list.
8 Conclusion
Attacks that exploit buffer overflow vulnerabilities in C and
C++ programs continue to be a severe security problem. In
this paper we present S3Library, a safer library reinforcement
that automatically replaces deprecated string/memcpy func-
tions with safer versions that perform bounds checking. Once
detecting a buffer overflow vulnerability, S3Library elimi-
nates it via boundless padding blocks that MinFat Pointer
allocator supplies, rather than terminate the program. Our ap-
proach explores the space of how tagged pointer approaches
trade security and overhead without the checks.
11
References
[1] Cwe - common weakness enumeration. https://cwe.
mitre.org/index.html.
[2] Intel safe string library. https://github.com/intel/
safestringlib.
[3] Matt miller. 2017. heap corruption issues reported to mi-
crosoft. (2017). https://twitter.com/epakskape/
status/851479629873332224.
[4] Nist software assurance reference dataset project.
https://samate.nist.gov/SARD/.
[5] Open watcom c++ class library reference ver-
sion 1.8. ftp://ftp.openwatcom.org/manuals/
current/cpplib.pdf.
[6] Safe c library - iso tr24731 bounds checking interface.
https://github.com/rurban/safeclib/.
[7] Periklis Akritidis, Manuel Costa, Miguel Castro, and
Steven Hand. Baggy bounds checking: An efficient and
backwards-compatible defense against out-of-bounds
errors. In USENIX Security Symposium, pages 51–66,
2009.
[8] Kumar Avijit, Prateek Gupta, and Deepak Gupta. Tied,
libsafeplus: Tools for runtime buffer overflow protection.
In USENIX Security Symposium, pages 45–56, 2004.
[9] Arash Baratloo, Navjot Singh, and Timothy Tsai. Lib-
safe: Protecting critical elements of stacks. White Paper
http://www. research. avayalabs. com/project/libsafe,
1999.
[10] Rodrigo Rubira Branco. Ltrace internals. In Proceed-
ings of the Linux Symposium, volume 1, pages 41–52.
Ottawa, ON, Canada, June, 2007.
[11] Marc Brünink, Martin Süßkraut, and Christof Fetzer.
Boundless memory allocations for memory safety and
high availability. In 2011 IEEE/IFIP 41st International
Conference on Dependable Systems & Networks (DSN),
pages 13–24. IEEE, 2011.
[12] Martin Sebor Carlos O’Donell. Field experi-
ence with annex k — bounds checking inter-
faces. http://www.open-std.org/jtc1/sc22/
wg14/www/docs/n1967.htm/, September 25, 2015.
Accessed 30 March, 2020.
[13] Gregory J Duck, Roland HC Yap, and Lorenzo Caval-
laro. Stack bounds protection with low fat pointers. In
NDSS, 2017.
[14] John L Henning. Spec cpu2006 benchmark descriptions.
ACM SIGARCH Computer Architecture News, 34(4):1–
17, 2006.
[15] Arm Holdings. Arm cortex-a series programmer’s guide
for armv8-a-15.2. dynamic voltage and frequency scal-
ing.
[16] Hossein Homaei and Hamid Reza Shahriari. Seven
years of software vulnerabilities: The ebb and flow.
IEEE Security & Privacy, 15(1):58–65, 2017.
[17] Michael Howard and Steve Lipner. The security devel-
opment lifecycle, volume 8. Microsoft Press Redmond,
2006.
[18] Richard WM Jones and Paul HJ Kelly. Backwards-
compatible bounds checking for arrays and pointers in
c programs. In Proceedings of the 3rd International
Workshop on Automatic Debugging; 1997 (AADEBUG-
97), number 001, pages 13–26. Linköping University
Electronic Press, 1997.
[19] ISO Jtc. Sc22/wg14. iso/iec 9899: 2011. In-
formation technology—Programming languages—C.
http://www. iso. org/iso/iso_catalogue/catalogue_ tc/-
catalogue_detail. htm, 2011.
[20] Taddeus Kroes, Koen Koning, Cristiano Giuffrida, Her-
bert Bos, and Erik van der Kouwe. Fast and generic
metadata management with mid-fat pointers. In Pro-
ceedings of the 10th European Workshop on Systems
Security, pages 1–6, 2017.
[21] Taddeus Kroes, Koen Koning, Erik van der Kouwe, Her-
bert Bos, and Cristiano Giuffrida. Delta pointers: Buffer
overflow checks without the checks. In Proceedings of
the Thirteenth EuroSys Conference, pages 1–14, 2018.
[22] Dmitrii Kuvaiskii, Oleksii Oleksenko, Sergei Arnau-
tov, Bohdan Trach, Pramod Bhatotia, Pascal Felber, and
Christof Fetzer. Sgxbounds: Memory safety for shielded
execution. In Proceedings of the Twelfth European Con-
ference on Computer Systems, pages 205–221, 2017.
[23] Albert Kwon, Udit Dhawan, Jonathan M Smith,
Thomas F Knight Jr, and Andre DeHon. Low-fat point-
ers: compact encoding and efficient gate-level implemen-
tation of fat pointers for spatial safety and capability-
based security. In Proceedings of the 2013 ACM
SIGSAC conference on Computer & communications
security, pages 721–732, 2013.
[24] Marc-André Laverdière, Serguei A Mokhov, and Djamel
Benredjem. On implementation of a safer c library,
iso/iec tr 24731. arXiv preprint arXiv:0906.2512, 2009.
[25] Martin Monperrus. Automatic software repair: a bibli-
ography. ACM Computing Surveys (CSUR), 51(1):1–24,
2018.
12
[26] WG14 N1106. N1106 austin group review of
iso/iec wdtr 24731 specification for secure c library
functions. http://www.open-std.org/jtc1/sc22/
wg14/www/docs/n1106.txt/, March 07, 2005. Ac-
cessed 30 March, 2020.
[27] Santosh Nagarakatte, Milo MK Martin, and Steve
Zdancewic. Everything you want to know about pointer-
based checking. In 1st Summit on Advances in Pro-
gramming Languages (SNAPL 2015). Schloss Dagstuhl-
Leibniz-Zentrum fuer Informatik, 2015.
[28] Santosh Nagarakatte, Jianzhou Zhao, Milo MK Martin,
and Steve Zdancewic. Softbound: Highly compatible
and complete spatial memory safety for c. In Proceed-
ings of the 30th ACM SIGPLAN Conference on Pro-
gramming Language Design and Implementation, pages
245–258, 2009.
[29] Santosh Nagarakatte, Jianzhou Zhao, Milo MK Martin,
and Steve Zdancewic. Cets: compiler enforced tem-
poral safety for c. In Proceedings of the 2010 inter-
national symposium on Memory management, pages
31–40, 2010.
[30] Oleksii Oleksenko, Dmitrii Kuvaiskii, Pramod Bhato-
tia, Pascal Felber, and Christof Fetzer. Intel mpx ex-
plained: An empirical study of intel mpx and software-
based bounds checking approaches. arXiv preprint
arXiv:1702.00719, 2017.
[31] Aashish Phansalkar, Ajay Joshi, and Lizy K John. Anal-
ysis of redundancy and application balance in the spec
cpu2006 benchmark suite. In Proceedings of the 34th
annual international symposium on Computer architec-
ture, pages 412–423, 2007.
[32] Martin Rinard. Acceptability-oriented computing. Acm
sigplan notices, 38(12):57–75, 2003.
[33] Martin Rinard, Cristian Cadar, Daniel Dumitran,
Daniel M Roy, and Tudor Leu. A dynamic technique for
eliminating buffer overflow vulnerabilities (and other
memory errors). In 20th Annual Computer Security
Applications Conference, pages 82–90. IEEE, 2004.
[34] Martin C Rinard, Cristian Cadar, Daniel Dumitran,
Daniel M Roy, Tudor Leu, and William S Beebee. En-
hancing server availability and security through failure-
oblivious computing. In OSDI, volume 4, pages 21–21,
2004.
[35] Olatunji Ruwase and Monica S Lam. A practical dy-
namic buffer overflow detector. In NDSS, volume 2004,
pages 159–169, 2004.
[36] Austria sba research. Implementation of c11 annex k
"bounds-checking interfaces" iso/iec 9899:2011. https:
//code.google.com/archive/p/slibc/, 2012.
[37] SC22/WG14/N997. Proposal for technical report on c
standard library security. Technical report, February 24,
2003.
[38] Robert C Seacord. Bounds-checking interfaces: Field
experience and future directions.
[39] Konstantin Serebryany, Derek Bruening, Alexander
Potapenko, and Dmitriy Vyukov. Addresssanitizer:
A fast address sanity checker. In Presented as part
of the 2012 {USENIX} Annual Technical Conference
({USENIX}{ATC} 12), pages 309–318, 2012.
[40] Kostya Serebryany, Evgenii Stepanov, Aleksey Shlyap-
nikov, Vlad Tsyrklevich, and Dmitry Vyukov. Memory
tagging and how it improves c/c++ memory safety. arXiv
preprint arXiv:1802.09517, 2018.
[41] Hossain Shahriar, Hisham M Haddad, and Ishan Vaidya.
Buffer overflow patching for c and c++ programs: rule-
based approach. ACM SIGAPP Applied Computing
Review, 13(2):8–19, 2013.
[42] Alex Shaw, Dusten Doggett, and Munawar Hafiz. Au-
tomatically fixing c buffer overflows using program
transformations. In 2014 44th Annual IEEE/IFIP Inter-
national Conference on Dependable Systems and Net-
works, pages 124–135. IEEE, 2014.
[43] Alexey Smirnov and Tzi-cker Chiueh. Automatic patch
generation for buffer overflow attacks. In Third Interna-
tional Symposium on Information Assurance and Secu-
rity, pages 165–170. IEEE, 2007.
[44] Laszlo Szekeres, Mathias Payer, Tao Wei, and Dawn
Song. Sok: Eternal war in memory. In 2013 IEEE
Symposium on Security and Privacy, pages 48–62. IEEE,
2013.
[45] ISO/IEC JTC1 SC22 WG14. Information technology,
programming languages, their environments and system
software interfaces, extensions to the c library, part i:
Bounds-checking interfaces. Technical report, March
28, 2007.
[46] John Wilander, Nick Nikiforakis, Yves Younan, Mariam
Kamkar, and Wouter Joosen. Ripe: runtime intrusion
prevention evaluator. In Proceedings of the 27th Annual
Computer Security Applications Conference, pages 41–
50, 2011.
[47] Jonathan Woodruff, Robert NM Watson, David Chisnall,
Simon W Moore, Jonathan Anderson, Brooks Davis,
Ben Laurie, Peter G Neumann, Robert Norton, and
Michael Roe. The cheri capability model: Revisiting
risc in an age of risk. In 2014 ACM/IEEE 41st Inter-
national Symposium on Computer Architecture (ISCA),
pages 457–468. IEEE, 2014.
13
[48] Wei Xu, Daniel C DuVarney, and R Sekar. An effi-
cient and backwards-compatible transformation to en-
sure memory safety of c programs. In Proceedings of the
12th ACM SIGSOFT twelfth international symposium
on Foundations of software engineering, pages 117–126,
2004.
14
